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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
The Arab Spring: a source of inspiration 
On December 17, 2010, an event occurred that possibly restarted the spread of 
democracy across the globe. Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year old street vendor from the small 
town of Sidi Bouzid in central Tunisia, set himself on fire in protest over abuse committed 
against him by corrupt town officials. He died eighteen days later, not knowing that the protests 
in his name would not only topple the Tunisian government, but would also bring the entire 
Arab world into political turmoil. The Arab Spring has been blooming ever since and –at the time 
of writing– still has not reached its conclusion. So far, the Arab Spring protests have forced Ben 
Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak and Morsi in Egypt, Gaddafi in Libya and Saleh in Yemen out of office. In 
addition, president Assad of Syria and the Bahraini monarchy are desperately weathering the 
civil uprisings in their countries by violently suppressing them with military force. And in other 
countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the political elites have proactively 
initiated major political reforms, hoping to be ahead of protests and attempting to prevent 
further escalations (Suarez 2011). 
The Arab Spring has still not reached its conclusion and its outcome is in many countries 
still uncertain, but nevertheless it can already be concluded that the Arab Spring is an 
unprecedented event in the modern Arab world. Still, protests and political instability are 
nothing new to the region. The Syrian people revolted against Hafez al-Assad (father of the 
current president) in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but were mercilessly crushed, resulting in 
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tens of thousands of deaths. There are similar examples in Iraq, Lebanon and Algeria. Many 
Arab countries have since the Second World War experienced various coups d’état, most 
notably Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. And where there were no coup d’états, more often than not we 
would see an increasingly autocratic role by the political establishment (Morocco, Algeria, 
Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia) or foreign intervention (Lebanon). But it is the first time in modern 
history that a bottom-up political movement of this magnitude is taking place in the Arab World, 
and it therefore deserves to be studied with particular scrutiny.  
What is driving the Arab Spring movement and how can we explain it? What makes the 
movement so successful and so big? And where is it heading? Can we expect democracies to 
arise in the region, or rather retreats to autocracy in a plea to preserve stability? Various 
sources, both academic and non-academic, have attributed the instability of Arab regimes to a 
restless and dissatisfied youth, that is also sizeable, well organized and influential (Al-Momani 
2011; Korotayev and Zinkina 2011; The Economist 2011; Ustundag 2013). But whether the 
influence of the youth is working in a pro- or anti-democratic direction still remains to be seen. 
These are guiding questions that have given me inspiration for writing this thesis. 
Theories drawn from democratization studies to explain the Arab 
Spring 
The Arab Spring is only the latest episode in a much longer process of democratization 
worldwide. Over the last two centuries, we have witnessed the spread of democracy from the 
United States of America to Europe and, eventually, every continent across the globe. Once a 
rare appearance, democracy has become the most popular form of government since the end of 
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the Cold War. As of 2010, the researchers who have created the Polity IV dataset label 95 
countries (with a population above 500,000) democratic, whereas only 22 are labeled autocratic 
(see Figure 1 below). 
  
Figure 1: Polity IV: Global Trends in Governance, 1946-2010 
When studying the graph above, a continued rise in the amount of democracies after the 
end of the Second World War can be observed. This rise stagnates somewhat in the sixties and 
seventies, but continues in the 1980s, and particularly around 1990, the end of the Cold War. 
After another successful decade, the spread of democracy appears to stagnate again since 2005, 
or at least on this graph. Meanwhile, the amount of autocracies, once the most common form 
of government, has dwindled dramatically since the end of the Cold War. These autocracies 
have either progressed into democracies or into anocracies, which can best be described as 
various regimes with some characteristics of democracies as well as autocracies. 
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In the study of democratization, one of the essential questions is how this worldwide 
spread of democracy can be explained. Over the last few decades, the academic community has 
answered this question in many different ways:  
- (Disappearance of) Social Divisions: When relations between social groups become such 
that there is a mutual distrust between them, each social group will strive to rule without a 
power-sharing arrangement with its rival social group. This is what Dahl (1971) called a 
“hegemony”.  Examples are old-style monarchies (royalty versus common citizens), the United 
States of America in the eighteenth century (only property-holding men could vote), and the 
Soviet Union (in which only one electoral candidate was available, who was pre-selected by the 
Politburo). Since democracy requires some degree of recognition of opposition groups, this 
situation is regarded as an obstacle to democratization. Dahl argues that only polyarchies –
states with high degrees of liberalization but also a high rate of inclusiveness– are a viable form 
of democracy.  This theory indeed has relevance to current developments in the Middle East. 
For example, the recent coup d’état of the Egyptian armed forces against President Morsi is 
generally seen as a response to the sentiment of marginalization that a large part of the 
Egyptian people experienced under the rule of the Muslim brotherhood. The most recent 
events not only demonstrate the social divisions existing within Egypt (Muslims versus 
Christians, orthodox Muslims versus moderate Muslims, the political elite versus the lower and 
middle class) but also the extent to which each group within that divided political landscape is 
intolerant to the other. 
- Historical context: A complex factor is the historical background that has in one way or 
another either contributed or impeded the democratization process in different cases. Lipset 
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(1959) argues that the earliest democracies in modern history were bolstered by Protestantism 
and Anglo-Saxon culture. Another interesting pattern is how many of the first modern cases of 
democracies are historically monarchies (Lipset 1960). Because the Middle East has been 
lagging behind on the democratization front, Islam has been characterized by some as a religion 
that is intrinsically hindering religion (Huntington 1996). However, that has been contested by 
others who instead blame the lack of democratization on uneven economic development. In 
many Middle Eastern states, political power is closely related to control of the wealth gained 
from oil exports (Ross 2001).  Interestingly, the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt is positioned right 
in the middle of this debate. Even though this Islamist party was elected democratically, its 
leader, President Morsi was widely criticized for ruling in an undemocratic fashion.1 
- Interactions with other states (wars, alliances): It is intuitive to argue that, when there is 
a lot of interaction between states, it is also no coincidence that they make strides toward 
democracy at the same time. Huntington’s theory of democratization waves (1991) is based on 
this premise. One democratization movement can spill over into a country that is geographically 
or culturally related. But likewise, countries that democratize can also be influenced by already 
established democracies. Indeed, it is striking how the three waves of democratization are 
preceded by periods in which allied democracies struggle and overcame their non-democratic 
adversaries. The first wave of democratization occurred when allied democracies defeated the 
non-democratic alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. The second 
wave started when allied democracies (in cooperation with the Soviet Union) defeated the 
fascist regimes of Germany, Italy and Japan. And the third wave reached its climax when the 
                                                     
1 For example, Morsi ruled in November 2012 that none of his presidential decrees could be 
reviewed in a court of law (Beaumont 2012). 
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Soviet Union was defeated by the democratic West (Huntington 1991; McFaul 2002). The Arab 
Spring might have initiated a fourth wave, although this idea is treated with caution and many 
hurdles are believed to be ahead (Diamond 2011). Whether the Arab Spring constitutes a 
democratization wave remains uncertain, but no matter in which way the movement can be 
prescribed, the widespread use of internet and social media by its instigators have surely 
facilitated and accelerated this movement (Howard and Hussain 2013). 
- Elite interactions: Democratization is usually not only enforced by a bottom-up populist 
movement. Rather, democratization also requires a specific interaction between different 
groups of elites (Casper and Taylor 1996). In transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy, 
the elite can be grouped in the ruling regime elite and the regime opposition. When liberalizing, 
the ruling elite may divide itself into a “status quo camp” and a liberal reform camp. The 
opposition, too, can be divided into a moderate camp that is willing to negotiate with the rulers 
and a radical camp that is keen on overthrowing the ruling elite. In this model, how 
democratization occurs (or how it is repressed), depends on how these different elite groups 
interact. In case of most of the countries involved in the Arab Spring (Tunisia, Libya, Syria), 
liberal reform camps were so marginalized that they were even forced to operate from outside 
the country. In Egypt during the Mubarak era, the Muslim brotherhood and other parties 
unofficially existed, although its candidates had to run for parliament as independents because 
the parties they represented were illegal. In Yemen, there was no opposing political elite worth 
mentioning. Out of all Arab Spring movements, the one in Yemen deserves to be called a 
bottom-up populist movement the most. This absence of a liberal reform camp among the elite 
is also reflected in its outcome: President Saleh was eventually replaced by Abd al-Hadi, who 
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had already been vice president under Saleh for 18 years, and thus a true change in the 
Yemenite political landscape has not (yet) occurred. 
- State repression: What might seem counterintuitive to some is that, during the biggest 
part of their tenure, authoritarian regimes are actually enjoying wide popular support (Francisco 
2005). It is only when regimes find themselves losing popularity that repression of their citizens 
is necessary to stay in power. However, drawing from evidence collected in the last few 
decades. leading scholars are increasingly convinced that when mass movements pushing for 
democracy become big enough, they are capable of toppling even the most repressive regimes 
(Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005). Institutional configurations and democracy:  In her landmark 
article, Geddes (1999) argues that the chance for countries ruled by authoritarian regimes 
depend on the type of authoritarian regime it is. She distinguishes between personalistic 
regimes, military regimes and single-party regimes. These different types are believed to 
influence the prospects a country has to achieve a stable democracy and the opportunities that 
pro-democracy actors have to change the status quo. After a longitudinal study, Geddes 
identifies single-party regimes as the ones most likely to endure. Coincidentally or not, many 
Arab countries before the Arab Spring either fall partially or fully into this category. Good 
examples are the regimes in Egypt (National Democratic Party), Syria (Ba’ath Party) and Iraq 
(Ba’ath Party), all of which require(d) great either great domestic effort or a foreign invasion to 
be toppled. However, interestingly, the regime that lasted the longest in the region was the 
personalistic regime of Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya. 
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Modernization theory in focus 
In the previous section, a variety of theories has been outlined, all of which can provide 
some degree of insight into the Arab Spring. In the context of democratization studies, however, 
perhaps the most popular theory explaining democratization is modernization theory. It is also 
the most important theory forming the background of this paper because it is the only theory 
capable of specifically analyzing the role of young adults in the democratization process, which 
is essential in understanding the Arab Spring movement. That is why it deserves a deeper 
analysis in a separate section. 
Modernization theory was incorporated within the realm of political science at the end 
of the 1950s.2  It regards a country’s democratization process as merely one element of its 
modernization as a whole (Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959, 1960) and argues that more modernized 
countries are more likely to be democratic (Lerner 1958). What exactly modernization means in 
this context is a whole set of variables that are debated among proponents of this theory. 
Despite the popularity of modernization theory, it has not always been devoid of 
criticism. Huntington (1968) noted that during the 1950s and particularly the 1960s, rapid social 
changes resulting from modernization led to an increase in political violence, which ran against 
expectations of modernization theory. Modernization, he argued, was actually an important 
source of political instability rather than a stabilizing factor. Another school of thought created 
in response to modernization theory was dependency theory. It took issue not with the problem 
                                                     
2 Modernization theory itself finds its roots in the Age of Enlightenment of the eighteenth 
century, during which prominent thinkers such as Voltaire and Turgot formulated the idea that 
the pursuit of science and the advancement of reason are key to the advancement of society as 
a whole. The exact workings of modernization were theorized for the first time by the 
sociologist Émile Durkheim at the turn of the twentieth century. 
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of social change and political violence but rather the consequences of economic development 
itself. O'Donnell (1973) and Cardoso and Faletto (1979) argued that the emergence of autocratic 
regimes in Latin America was attributed to increased dependence on the West (and particularly 
the United States) in a globalizing economy. In a similar vein, to this day it is argued that the 
flow of investment capital from the Western world is distributed unequally within the 
developing world, which in turn not only stimulates plutocracy rather than democracy in the 
developing world, but also keeps the imbalances global trade system in place (Toye and Toye 
2003).  
As a result of these responses to modernization theory, it lost popularity during the 
1970s and 1980s until the end of the Cold War, when the third wave of democratization swept 
most powerfully across the world. Not only did most former communist countries democratize, 
many third world countries did the same, particularly after periods of economic growth. This 
observation was used as a counter-attack against dependency theory by Przeworski and Limongi 
(1997). Ever since, modernization theory has regained its popularity, and convincing studies 
such as Inglehart and Welzel (2005) provided elaborate quantitative evidence to support the 
theory and to demonstrate the meticulousness as to how the modernization process occurs. 
Which elements of modernization exactly contributed to the spread of democracy has 
been widely debated. Although a wide range of modernization factors has been proposed, most 
notably economic factors have been associated with it (Lipset 1959).  To date, economic 
development is the only element of modernization that has been generally accepted as 
contributing to democracy (Welzel 2009). Even though some important political scientists have 
doubted the importance of economic development in relation to democratization in the past 
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(Acemoglu et al. 2008; Epstein et al. 2006; Przeworski and Limongi 1997), it has been 
successfully defended by others (Boix and Stokes 2003; Geddes 1999). Other variables have 
been proposed too, such as urbanization, literacy rates, and access to media and 
communication devices (e.g. telephone, internet), but these proposal have been met with more 
criticism and have thus far not convinced the entire modernization theory community. 
Political demography and its place within modernization theory 
 
Since the last decade, and particularly in the last few years, a new modernization factor 
has been proposed to contribute to democratization and that is demographic change, 
specifically the demographic transition. The demographic transition is a standard pattern in 
which birth and mortality rates develop over time as a country develops.  It can schematically be 
divided into four stages. Figure 2 (see next page) illustrates how, under normal circumstances, a 
country’s birth and mortality rate (vertical axis) develop over time (horizontal axis). During stage 
1, both mortality rates and birth rates are high and in equilibrium. Then, as a country 
modernizes, initially the mortality rate drops (stage 2), followed by a drop in birth rate (stage 3). 
Eventually, a country finds itself at a lower equilibrium of birth and mortality rates (stage 4). The 
red line in figure 2 shows that, during a country’s demographic transition, its population also 
goes up. Also, the ratio between younger and older people changes dramatically. This is not only 
because the birth rate decreases, but also because life expectancy increases. The more a 
country progresses through its demographic transition, the smaller the percentage of young 
adults is in the population. From an economic perspective, progressing through the 
demographic transition constitutes a “demographic window of opportunity” (National 
Intelligence Council 2013). This is because particularly during stage 3 of the transition phase, the 
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national population is not only growing as a whole (and thus also the country’s importance in 
the world economy), the working population specifically also makes up a considerable part of 
the entire population, and is capable of having long, productive careers due to an improved 
health care system. 
 
 
Figure 2: Schematic overview of the demographic transition model 
The demographic approach to politics has been labeled “political demography” 
(Goldstone, Kaufmann, and Duffy Toft 2012; Weiner 1971). Herbert Moller was the first to 
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suggest the demographic factor in the modernization debate (Moller 1968), although he did not 
link demographic changes to democratization itself. He enumerates a list of very diverse 
moments in history where political change has coincided with “youth bulges”3, such as the 
Protestant Reformation (1520s), the French Revolution (1789), the breakup of the Habsburg 
Empire (1880-1918), the fall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Adolf Hitler (1933) and the 
African-American Civil Rights Movement (1955-1968). However, even though his enumeration 
of youth movements is certainly eye-catching, it lacks scientific rigor to rule out that instances of 
political change can only be explained by large youth cohorts coinciding with the particular 
period in which certain political events occurred. For example, while Moller’s suggestion of the 
important role of youth in Hitler’s rise to power is captivating, he does not give 
counterarguments to disprove the traditional historical explanation.  
Weiner (1971) was the first to formally define the new study of political demography. He 
defined it as ‘the study of the size, composition, and distribution of population in relation to 
both government and politics.’ The argument that, in times of a “youth bulge”, there is an 
increased chance of regime instability and/or political violence, has repeatedly been made since 
then (Choucri 1974; Fuller and Pitts 1990; Goldstone 1991, 2002; Leahy Madsen 2011; Leahy 
Madsen et al. 2007; Mesquida and Wiener 1999; Urdal 2006, 2007, 2011). Similar research is 
still done today, such as Weber (2012), who argues that as the proportion of young men in a 
democratic country’s population increases,  its chance for democratic collapse also increases. 
Only in the last few years has it been proposed that countries that have progressed 
down the path of the demographic transition process are more likely to become democratic 
                                                     
3 Youth bulges can be defined as “extraordinary large youth cohorts relative to the adult 
population” (Urdal 2004).  
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(Cincotta 2009; Dyson 2013). Countries which have not progressed fully through the 
demographic transitions process yet, it is argued, are experiencing a high risk of political 
violence and civil strife (Leahy Madsen et al. 2007; Mesquida and Wiener 1999; Urdal 2004, 
2006, 2007, 2011). This is because countries that have not yet progressed fully through the 
demographic transition still have a youthful population. It is argued that youth are more likely to 
support a political extreme ideology (whereas democracy requires a politically moderate climate 
to facilitate dialog), are easier indoctrinated by political leaders and are more capable of 
political violence (Weber 2012).  This observation is connected with Hobbes’ theory of the social 
contract: in a political climate of perceived threats to security, citizens are willing to give up 
basic freedoms in exchange for guarantees to security from authoritarian leaders (Cincotta 
2009; Cincotta and Doces 2012).  This in turn is believed to be an obstacle to the 
democratization process. Thus, youth, when overrepresented in a country’s population, are 
argued to be an obstacle to democracy (Cincotta 2008). 
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The puzzle 
In the previous section, a new movement has been described that links the demographic 
transition with democratization. When studying figure 3 (see below) at first glance, the notion 
that the demographic transition contributes to democratization indeed seems to make sense. 
 
Figure 3: Trends of variables associated with modernization (1950-2010). 
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When selecting all countries with a population over 500,000 (taking 1950 as the year of 
measurement) and observing them longitudinally from 1950 until 2010, an increase in the mean 
level of democracy can be observed (as is measured by the mean Polity IV score).4 Similarly, 
there is an increase in the mean median age for all countries combined, as well as a decrease in 
the mean percentage of adults aged 15-29. Median age and the percentage of adults aged 15-
29 are both indicators of the extent in which a country has progressed through its demographic 
transition.5 Finally, there is also an increase in mean GDP per capita that coincides with the 
increase in the mean level of democracy, particularly after around 1980. In sum, all four 
variables in figure 3 are moving in the same direction, and thus it is logical to suspect at least a 
correlation between these variables, although this graph does not yet give any clue as to the 
causal direction between these variables. 
However, the reliability of the observation that the demographic transition and 
democratization are linked comes under fire when relating this to the practical context of the 
Arab Spring.  If an increase in median age and a decrease in the percentage of young adults are 
supposed to facilitate democratization, should the Arab Spring not rather result in a retreat to 
autocracy? After all, in various Arab countries, a “youth bulge” has been observed (Cincotta 
2009, 2011; Dhillon 2008; Korotayev and Zinkina 2011), which should theoretically destabilize a 
                                                     
4 The decrease in the mean Polity IV score between 1950 can at least partially be explained by 
newly established independent countries that have only just freed themselves from colonial 
rule. More often than not, these countries have autocratic regimes, particularly in their first few 
decades. These newly independent countries negatively influence not only the mean Polity IV 
score, but also the other three variables in the above graph (with the exception of the mean 
percentage of adults aged 15-29 because this variable follows an inverse trend when compared 
to the other three variables). 
5 Median age is the dependent variable used by Dyson (2013). Percentage of adults aged 15-29 
is a more widely used variable in the political demography literature. It is used by Cincotta and 
Doces (2012) and Weber (2012), amongst others. 
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country and thus instigate a public call for increased security and thus less political freedoms 
(the Hobbesian bargain). There are thus conflicting insights into the role of young adults in the 
democratization process, and it is the goal of this paper to give further clarity on this issue 
within the framework of modernization theory by means of quantitative research. 
There are multiple reasons why it is interesting to do further research into the role of 
young adults in the democratization process. Firstly, even though this theory has only been 
established recently, it has already made its impact on government policy. For example, the 
National Intelligence Council, an important advisory organization to the United States 
government, included policy recommendations based on the premise that the demographic 
transition and the democratization process are linked in its Global Trends 2025 report (2008), 
which was presented to Barack Obama at the start of his first term as President of the United 
States. As such, it is obvious that putting this theory under academic scrutiny is of high practical 
relevance. 
Secondly, giving more insight in the role of young adults in the democratization process 
makes a contribution not only to the political demography literature, but also to modernization 
theory as a whole and to the democratization debate in general. This topic deserves closer 
attention as well because, intuitively, there are reasons to doubt the validity of the arguments 
that young adults obstruct the democratization process. From a historical perspective,  (Moller 
1968) already argued for the importance of youth in enforcing political change. But if the youth 
are such an instrumental force in bringing about political change, why should such change not 
also include a change toward democratization?  
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Thirdly, there are not only intuitive reasons that can lead one to be suspicious of this 
theory. When studying history, the plausibility of this theory is further reduced because it is at 
odds with various historical examples. For instance, the overthrow of Indonesia’s dictatorial 
government under President Suharto in 1998 and the subsequent transition towards democracy 
(the 1998 “Reformasi”) occurred under circumstances in which the demographic transition 
stagnated for some years. In the years leading up to the 1998 Reformasi, the percentage of 
young adults actually proved to be somewhat higher than before. In other historical cases, such 
as Singapore or China, autocratic regimes remain firmly in place despite already having (nearly) 
completed the demographic transition. In such cases, the theory predicts that a transition 
toward democracy should already have occurred and fails to explain why the real political 
situation in these countries turns out to be rather different. 
Fourthly, the supportive arguments brought forward by those defending the position 
that young adults impede democratization are not all indisputable and deserve to be further 
inspected. This will be discussed in the next section. 
Reasons to doubt previous research 
In the previous section, I have discussed the question of what is the role of young adults 
in the democratization process. Before starting my own research, this section details the 
shortcomings of previous research that has attempted to answer this question. It provides a 
motivation on how to address the same question with a different methodology. 
 Proponents of the theory that young adults impede democratization argue that, when a 
large proportion of a country’s population consists of young adults, this reduces the country’s 
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chances of becoming a democracy. However, the supportive arguments for this position are 
unpersuasive. These supportive arguments will be discussed below. 
Cincotta and Doces (2012, 103) hypothesize that “a youthful age structure tends to 
impede the advent of liberal democracy”. This hypothesis is echoed in other key articles of this 
new school of thought as well (Cincotta 2008; Dyson 2013; Weber 2012). A large presence of 
youth is argued to destabilize a country, and this supposedly favors autocracy. Hereby the 
authors assume that autocratic regimes are intrinsically better at dealing with instability. But a 
quality of democracy is that its structure allows for a peaceful transition of leadership. This is 
particularly true for consensus democracies with power-sharing arrangements such as 
Switzerland and Belgium (Lijphart 1999). In these systems, minorities are better represented in 
the executive branch of government and therefore are less inclined to feel marginalized. A 
convincing case can be made that this form of government can actually provide more stability 
than autocratic regimes (Andeweg 2000). 
Cincotta uses the Hobbesian Bargain6 as an argument to support the demography theory 
(Cincotta 2009). However, Hobbes’ theory is already dating from 1651. Hobbes himself did not 
test his theory with empirical evidence, and even if he did, the theory itself could very well be 
outdated. Although it makes an interesting philosophical argument, to use the Hobbesian 
Bargain as a supporting argument does not meet today’s academic standards. Furthermore, 
Cincotta does not provide evidence that, in the minds of citizens, threats to one’s personal 
security and property are actually perceived to be caused by a large presence of youth. Also, in 
connection to the Hobbesian Bargain argument, Cincotta curiously argues that Indonesia is an 
                                                     
6 The Hobbesian Bargain postulates that ‘citizens are willing to relinquish liberties when faced 
with threats to their security and property’ (Cincotta 2009). 
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example of a country democratizing because of the demographic transition (Cincotta 2008). This 
cannot be a good example for multiple reasons. First of all, the demographic figures do not 
speak in Cincotta’s favor. There is no case of a decreasing percentage of youth, and actually in 
the years leading up to the overthrow of Suharto, there was even a youth bulge. Following 
Cincotta’s Hobbesian Bargain argument, this would mean that Indonesia was actually supposed 
to become even more autocratic. However, in reality, it was particularly the students and other 
young adults who pushed for democratic change by means of numerous pro-democracy 
protests in in 1998, that were incidentally mostly non-violent and supported by the majority of 
the Indonesian public. 
Cincotta also fails to explain cases in which a country has remained autocratic despite 
the fact that it has already completed its demographic transition. When these cases occur, he 
resorts to a curious explanation that these countries have remained autocratic because their 
rulers are exceptionally charismatic (Cincotta 2009). This line of reasoning falsely assumes that a 
country’s democratization process (or lack thereof) solely depends on the charisma of its 
political leader, and in fact, Cincotta does not give any evidence to support this claim. Is it really 
not possible that countries have democratized, despite the fact that their leaders were 
exceptionally charismatic? Or is it really not possible that countries have remained autocratic 
despite the fact that their leaders are not exceptionally charismatic? Without proper evidence, 
it is easy to claim that a leader was “perhaps charismatic, but not charismatic enough”, but this 
argument lacks credibility. 
Another proponent of the theory that young adults impede democratization is Timothy 
Dyson (2013), although he presents different supporting arguments than Cincotta. However, 
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these arguments are equally doubtful. Dyson’s first argument is that, when during a 
demographic transition period the birth rate decreases, there is an increasing opportunity for 
women to play a bigger public role because it is no longer necessary for many women to stay 
home to raise children. This development, according to Dyson, is in itself already a step toward 
democracy but he also argues that a larger presence of women in public roles positively 
influences the democratization process.  However, the advancement of women’s rights should 
not be equated with a step toward democracy in general. This is clearly demonstrated when 
observing (post-) communist countries, in which women’s rights have been on a high level for 
decades. A recent report even suggested that China has the highest percentage of female top 
executives (Grant Thornton 2013). As such, China is regarded by many to be even ahead of 
many democracies on the issue of women’s rights. Yet, China is clearly far from a democracy. 
Civil and political rights in China might be severely limited, but these limitations apply equally to 
men and women. Besides, at this moment, Dyson’s argument that a public role of women in 
society facilitates democratization is premature. There is no evidence to support the position 
that women on average favor democracy more than men, nor is there any evidence that women 
play a more democratizing role than men in any other way. 
Dyson also argues that “the basis for establishing a consensus for rule by elected 
representatives in proportion to the numbers of people is likely to be facilitated by slower 
population growth [which occurs at the end of the demographic transition]” (Dyson 2013, 85-
86), but he does not provide evidence to support this claim. Korotayev and Zinkina (2011) make 
a valuable counter-point that when demographic changes occur, a country’s stability does not 
necessarily have to be diminished, even in the case of autocratic regimes. They make a 
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compelling argument that Egypt’s Arab Spring was not just caused by marginalized youth, but 
rather that Mubarak’s government failed to respond in time to youth issues such as rising youth 
unemployment. Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that younger generations are 
actually more in favor of democracy than their elders. That is particularly true for the post-Cold 
War period. The demise of the Soviet Union bolstered the image of democracy worldwide. This 
is reflected in the sheer amount of countries that democratized around 1990. Also, the rise of 
Internet and other mass media particularly affects the younger generations in modernizing 
countries. Through access to this media, youth are connected with and influenced by media 
from developed, democratic countries, which in turn positively influences their opinion of 
democracy. Besides that, digital media also has proven to be an effective political mobilization 
tool in the case of the Arab Spring (Howard and Hussain 2013). It is therefore expected that 
today’s younger generations are even more supportive of democracy than the youth of the 
1990s. 
The value of education 
In addition to responding to the arguments put forward by Cincotta and Dyson, one 
more important counter argument against the theory that young adults impede 
democratization can be made. When examining the role of young adults in the democratization 
process, it should be noted that the youth of today are not the same as the youth of a few 
decades ago in important respects. Today, youth are on average much higher educated than a 
few decades ago. This, in turn, makes them also more supportive of democracy (Lutz, Crespo 
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Cuaresma, and Abbasi-Shavazi 2010). 
 
Figure 4: Trend of the mean Polity IV score and the mean percentage of higher educated 
young adults over time (1950-2010). 
Indeed, figure 4 looks promising regarding a possible link between education and 
democratization, but besides statistical evidence on a large scale, other evidence suggesting this 
link already exists. Regardless of age, higher education rates have already been associated with 
more democratic politics since the 1950s (Lipset 1959, 1960). Evidence on an individual level has 
already shown a positive causal mechanism between education and political participation 
(Brady, Verba, and Lehman Schlozman 1995), which in turn is argued to stimulate 
democratization (Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer 2007).  A higher educated youth are less 
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inclined to adopt politically extreme positions and are also less likely to be manipulated 
politically (Lutz, Crespo Cuaresma, and Abbasi-Shavazi 2010). This reduces the possible 
destabilizing influence of young adults on the political climate, thus undermining the theory that 
young adults impede democratization. Actually, it can be stated that, since particularly in 
developing countries the younger generations are more highly educated than the older 
generations, they can also be expected to be more inclined to support democracy than the 
older generations in the same countries.  It is therefore important to be careful in comparing 
data regarding youth from a few decades ago with more recent data regarding youth. It is 
striking that none of the literature defending the theory that young adults impede 
democratization addresses this argument, and both Cincotta and Doces treat young adults from 
a few decades ago exactly the same as young adults today. 
 
For these reasons, I wish to contest the position that young adults impede 
democratization in my own research.  
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Chapter 2: The research 
Towards a new database to test the influence of young adults on 
democratization  
In the previous chapter, I have given a step-by-step explanation on why it is necessary to 
carry out research on what the role is of young adults on democratization from a demographic 
and quantitative perspective. In this chapter, a description is given of how that research is 
carried out.  
A methodology has been adopted that on the one hand strives to maximize 
comparability with previous findings, while on the other hand introduces new perspectives on 
how to answer the research question. Unfortunately, there is no way of perfectly achieving both 
of these goals and sacrifices on both have to be made.  
Measuring the degree of democracy 
The two most important variables for this research are measures of democracy and 
measures of how far each country has progressed through its demographic transition. When 
measuring the degree of democratization, we have to take into account that the concept of 
democracy is as broad as it is old. Aristotle, himself a citizen of the first democracy in the world, 
already studied the conditions in society which determine different forms of government 
(including democracy) prevail in his work Politics. Of course, the concept of democracy has 
much changed since the fourth century BC. Today, when people speak of democracy, they are 
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not only referring to the narrow concept of free and fair elections. Rather, democracy has 
effectively become an umbrella term for different societal elements that are supposed to be 
paired with free and fair elections in modern society, such as freedom of expression, freedom of 
press, rule of law and minority rights. It is therefore fitting to use an adjusted form of the Polity 
IV score from the Polity IV database (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2012), which aims to measure 
the political and societal elements that most would associate with a modern democracy today. 
The Polity IV score is a net score of two different scales indicating democratic characteristics and 
autocratic characteristics. On both the scale indicating democratic and autocratic 
characteristics, elements are measured in the areas of competitiveness of executive recruitment 
(e.g. “are multiple parties and individuals allowed to run in elections?”), openness of executive 
recruitment (e.g. “are all citizens allowed to run for elections?” ), constraints on the chief 
executive (e.g. “are there any limitations to the authorities of the president?”), regulation of 
participation (only for the autocratic scale, e.g. “are there institutions that regulate how political 
preferences are expressed?”) and competitiveness of participation (e.g. “do opposition groups 
have space within the legislative institutions to push for an alternative agenda?”). If a country’s 
political system has more democratic characteristics than autocratic ones, its net Polity IV score 
will be positive, and vice versa. The highest possible score is +10 (+10 on the democratic scale, 0 
on the autocratic scale) and the lowest possible score is -10 (0 on the democratic scale, -10 on 
the autocratic scale). However, some of the Polity IV data falls outside of the -10/+10 range for 
various reasons. These outliers have been recoded so that they fall within the desired 
spectrum.7 
                                                     
7 The Polity IV dataset includes scores outside of the -10/+10 range for exceptional 
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 By using the Polity IV dataset, this research departs from previous research on the same 
topic carried out by Cincotta and Doces (2012) and Dyson (2013).  Cincotta and Dyson use the 
Freedom House scores for their research (Freedom House 2013). While it is a fair and generally 
respected reference to measure the degree of democracy, the Freedom House rating has its 
shortcomings. Freedom House focuses more on political freedoms and civil liberties from a 
citizen point of view, and less on variables on a governmental level such as the fairness of the 
election procedures. Furthermore, it is also The Freedom House dataset also suffers from 
conceptual shortcomings. Also, while Freedom House has admittedly taken steps in recent years 
to increase the transparency of their methodology, they still offer insufficient insight as to how 
the final score is calculated (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). The final measure is also less 
preferable vis-à-vis the Polity IV score: the subcategory scores of the Freedom House dataset 
are added to a score for two variables: Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Then, a country is 
called either “free”, “partially free” or “not free”. Although these terms sound like they are easy 
to understand, they are also more arbitrary when compared to the Polity IV score due to the 
ambiguous thresholds deciding in which of the three categories a country falls. Also, lumping 
countries into three categories is needlessly removing subtle differences in the degree of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
circumstances: -66 for cases when country regimes have been interrupted by foreign powers, -
77 for cases of “interregnum” or “anarchy” and -88 for cases of transition from one type of 
regime to another. The interregnum (-77) and transition (-88) cases have been recoded to a 
score between the previous year and the successive year. For example: Cambodia had an 
interregnum period in 1975. Its Polity IV score for 1974 is -5 while its score for 1976 is -7. Thus, 
the score for 1975 is calculated as (-5- 7)/2=-6. When the interregnum or transition case takes 
multiple years, the annual scores are calculated as a “step by step” change. For example, after 
the Iraq War in 2003, Iraq went through an 8-year transition from an autocratic regime rated -9 
to an anocracy rated +3 on the Polity IV scale. This 12-point gap has been bridged by annual 
steps dividing the gap in 8 parts. Hence, the following scores are calculated: 2003: -7.5; 2004: -6; 
2005: -4.5; 2006: -3; 2007: -1.5; 2008: 0; 2009: 1.5; 2010: 3. 
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democracy or autocracy. Admittedly, the Freedom House can still serve well in a statistical 
model in which independent variables are used to predict the dependent variable by means of 
trinomial (free/partly free/not free) logistic regression. 8 
Dyson’s recent paper (2013) uses Vanhanen’s database (Vanhanen 2013), which is more 
straightforward but also less precise in its measure of democracy.9 This database is 
subsequently multiplied by a country’s median age. While its appeal for its simplicity is 
understandable, it is also highly inaccurate. For example, the Vanhanen system gets very 
different results for two given democracies when they have different electoral systems. For 
example, the two-party system of the United States gets very different results compared to a 
multi-party system such as The Netherlands. Because in the United States, elections are typically 
won by a narrow margin between the Democrats and the Republicans, the amount of votes to 
parties other than the winning party is relatively large. In Vanhanen’s database, this 
corresponds to a relatively democratization index compared to multi-party systems. In a multi-
party system such as in the Netherlands, the amount of votes going to parties other than the 
winning party can be as high as 75%, which is reflected in a much higher democratization index 
                                                     
8 The Polity IV dataset could serve for the purpose of logistic regression too. Marshall, Jaggers 
and Gurr (2012) designate any country in the database with a Polity IV score of +6 or higher to 
be a democracy and any country with a score of -6 or lower to be an autocracy. For example, 
trinomial logistic regression (predicting democracy/anocracy/autocracy as in figure 1) is an 
interesting alternative.  
9 Dyson 2013: “Vanhanen’s index of democratization is the product of two variables. The first, C, 
measures the extent to which political competition occurs in society. This is reflected by the 
proportion of electoral votes that goes to parties other than the largest one. The second, P, 
measures the degree to which there is political participation. This is indicated mainly by voter 
turnout, expressed as a proportion of the population, although allowance is also made for the 
taking of referendums. The upper limit of both proportions is restricted at 0.7. Therefore the 
value of ID (=C*P*100) ranges between zero and a theoretical—and unattained—maximum of 
49.” 
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than for the United States. This does not reflect reality because generally the Netherlands are 
not regarded to be more democratized than the United States. Also, Vanhanen’s database 
simply omits other elements that are vital for modern democracies in its measurement, such as 
constraints on the executive.  
Another approach to researching the role of youth on democratization perhaps could 
have been creating a dataset of instances where democratization did and did not occur, as 
measured by increases in the Polity IV score per country. However, the drawback of this 
approach is that there is no clear and unambiguous definition of how big a shift in the Polity IV 
needs to be in order for it to qualify as a valid shift toward democracy. No matter where you 
draw the line, there will always be a grey area where certain cases could be qualified either as a 
move to democracy or not. It is therefore more appropriate to use the Polity IV score itself, 
which is an ordinal value and does not require any labeling. Letting the Polity IV numbers speak 
for themselves in this regard gives more precision to the research and eliminates the risk of 
selection bias. 
Demographic variables 
Regarding measurement of the demographic transition, both of the most prevalent 
demographic variables from previous research have been used, which are median age and the 
proportion of young adults in the overall adult population.10 For most of the countries, this 
                                                     
10 In my dataset, median age is a straightforward median age measurement of the entire 
population. This mirrors Dyson’s dataset. For the proportion of young adults in the overall adult 
population, some calculations are necessary. First data in which the national population is split 
in 5-year categories (e.g. 0-4, 5-9, etc.) is selected. Then, the percentage of young adults is 
calculated by dividing the population aged between 15-29 by the entire population aged 15 and 
31 
 
demographic data can easily be found on the United Nations Population Division website 
(United Nations Population Division 2013), but the database has been expanded by 
calculations11 and data collection outside the United Nations database.12 Median age is a 
straightforward tool to indicate to which extent a country has progressed through its 
demographic transition.13 Also, the proportion of young adults per country can easily be 
calculated using data from the United Nations Population Division website. Both measurements 
are adopted in order to maximize comparability with previous research findings. Whereas the 
median age is generally used to measure the extent to which a country has completed its 
demographic transition, the proportion of young adults is the most often used variable in the 
“youth bulge” literature. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
above. This means that children aged 0-14 are not part of this figure, which is reasonable since 
they are not politically active. This nearly mirrors the method chosen by Cincotta, who divides 
the population aged 15-29 by the population aged 15-64 (the working population). In my own 
dataset, I also include citizens aged above 64, and for good reasons too: not only is the working 
population nowadays expanding to ages above 64, but it is also perfectly possible to be 
politically active in whichever degree without being part of the working population. 
11 Regarding the proportion of young adults, data for some countries that used to be united in 
the past has been calculated by using data from the separate countries (e.g. data for 
Czechoslovakia between 1950 and 1990 was calculated by using data from the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia for the same years). This unfortunately could not be done for median age because 
data with a perfect age distribution of both countries, which is needed in order to calculate the 
median age, is not available. As a result, the database used for this research has a slightly bigger 
collection of figures regarding the  
12 Extra demographic data was obtained by contacting the national statistical agencies of  
Germany (for data regarding West Germany and East Germany between 1950 and 1990) and 
Taiwan (which is not a member of the United Nations and therefore does not have its 
demographic data in the United Nations Population Division database. 
13 The further a country has progressed through its demographic transition, the lower its 
amount of children and young adults, and the higher its amount of middle-aged and senior 
citizens. Thus, median age increases when a country progresses through its demographic 
transition. This is also a good way to measure the proportion of young adults in a population, 
albeit indirectly. 
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Economic development 
 Economic data from the Penn World Table (version 7.1) have been used for this 
research. The Penn World Tables are a leading indicator of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
per capita. Specifically, purchasing power parity (PPP) converted GDP per capita at 2005 
constant prices in international dollars has been chosen because this most tangibly reflects the 
degree of economic wealth that is present on a citizen level. GDP per capita reflects the degree 
of economic development that a country has reached. Since this is the most widely accepted 
variable to contribute to democratization in modernization theory literature, it has been 
incorporated into the database. When including this variable in statistical analysis, it can give 
some sense regarding how influential the other variables are when they are compared with the 
uncontested variable of economic development. 
Education 
In order to measure the degree to which a country’s younger adults are educated, the 
IIASA/VID14 database has been used for this research (KC et al. 2010; Lutz et al. 2007). This is the 
only global database measuring national education rates in 5-year age groups, which also makes 
it the only suitable database for measuring the education rate of the young adults group (aged 
15-29) as precisely as possible. The data is given for each 5 years between 1970 and 2010. Data 
for the years 2000, 2005 and 2010 are forward projections based on source data from 1995 by 
using the Global Education Trend (GET) scenario, as is recommended by the creators of this data 
                                                     
14 IIASA stands for the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (based in Laxenburg, 
Austria). VID stands for the Vienna Institute of Demography. 
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(KC et al. 2010).  Unfortunately, the IIASA/VID database only dates back to 1970, so education 
rates before that year are unavailable. Also, the database does not cover every country 
worldwide. Only about 120 countries are covered. This unfortunately limits the general 
database used for this research somewhat. 
The education rates are expressed in terms of the International Standard Classification 
of Education (ISCED) 1997 levels of education. An ISCED level of 5 or 6 indicates that a person 
has received tertiary (post-high school) education. By multiplying the percentage of the people 
within the age categories 15-19, 20-24 and 25-29 with their respective proportions within the 
entire adult population, a new variable is created called “influence of higher educated young 
adults”. This variable measures the proportion of the entire adult population (age 15 and above) 
that is both young (between 15 and 29 years old) and highly educated. 
Sample (countries and years) 
This research was intended to be carried out with data from as many countries and years 
as possible, using data ranging from 1948 until 2010.  This is because the data are derived from 
different sources which also use different intervals between measurements.  The United 
Nations Population Division (UNPD) data for median age and proportion of young adults, as well 
as the education rate data are collected each 5 years (from 1970 until 2010), while the Polity IV 
dataset has a score for each country for each year. In order to merge these data, the annual 
Polity IV data are recoded to 5-year averages.15 Using 5-year averages rather than annual Polity 
                                                     
15 For example, for the year 1950, an average Polity IV score is calculated from the data of 1948, 
1949, 1950, 1951 and 1952; then, for 1955, the average score is calculated from the data of 
1953, 1954, 1955, 1956 and 1957; etc. At the moment of writing this paper, there is no Polity IV 
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IV data has an advantage: it calculates a more robust indication of the extent to which a country 
is democratized, and that is less influenced by short-term political developments. Also, it 
reflects the entire political history that a country has gone through over the years in a more 
accurate fashion. This method allows for almost all of the Polity IV annual scores to be included, 
and except for Bosnia-Herzegovina, every country has been included in the database.16 
Demographic data regarding the median age and the proportion of young adults are only 
available for the larger countries that have a population above 100,000 (taking 1950 as the year 
of measurement), but Polity IV only has a dataset of countries with a population smaller than 
500,000 are excluded from the research. This means that, in the end, only countries with a 
population over 500,000 are included in the research.17  
                                                                                                                                                                            
data for 2011 and 2012, so only data from 2008, 2009 and 2010 are used in order to calculate 
the average scores for 2010. Also, for some of the countries that have not existed continuously 
between 1948 and 2010, other average scores have been calculated with less than 5 years of 
data. For example, since Kenya only gained independence in 1964, no average scores are 
included for 1950, 1955 and 1960. To calculate the average score for 1965, only 4 years are 
used: 1964, 1965, 1966 and 1967.  
 16 Bosnia-Herzegovina has been excluded entirely because, ever since its independence in 1993, 
it only has recorded Polity IV scores of -77 (interregnum) and -66 (foreign interruption). 
Therefore, no meaningful or reliable score can be assigned that falls within the -10/+10 range. 
Also, the following cases have been removed because they could not be used as part of a 5-year 
average: Trinidad & Tobago 1962; Guyana 1966-1967; Serbia 2006-2007; Macedonia 1991-1992; 
Croatia 1991-1992; Yugoslavia (ccode 347) 1991-1992; Montenegro 2006-2007; Slovenia 1991-
1992; Moldova 1991-1992; Russia 1992; Estonia 1991-1992; Latvia 1991-1992; Lithuania 1991-
1992; Ukraine 1991-1992; Belarus 1991-1992; Armenia 1991-1992; Georgia 1991-1992; 
Azerbaijan 1991-1992; Sierra Leone 1961-1962; Uganda 1962; Tanzania 1961-1962; Burundi 
1962; Rwanda 1961-1962; Djibouti 1977; Lesotho 1966-1967; Botswana 1996-1967; Morocco 
1956-1957; Algeria 1962; Libya 1951-1952; Sudan 1956-1957; South Yemen 1967; Bahrain 1971-
1972; Qatar 1971-1972; United Arab Emirates 1971-1972; Turkmenistan 1991-1992; Tajikistan 
1991-1992; Kyrgyzstan 1991-1992; Uzbekistan 1991-1992; Kazakhstan 1991-1992; Bangladesh 
1972; Vietnam 1976-1977; Malaysia 1957; Timor-Leste 2002. 
17 It may also be true that data from smaller countries may be less reliable due to different 
political behavior that is observed in these small countries. 
35 
 
From the final database, a sample has been created that ranges from 1970 until 2010 in 
5-year intervals. 1970 has the smallest amount of cases (73), while 1995 until 2010 all have the 
biggest amount (97). The increase in the amount of countries after 1990 is explained by the end 
of the Cold War and the post-communist countries that have been added to the education rates 
source database since then.18 
Year N 
1970 73 
1975 77 
1980 78 
1985 78 
1990 81 
1995 97 
2000 97 
2005 97 
2010 97 
 
Figure 5: Overview of the amount of cases per year in the research sample 
When studying figure 6 (see next page), it is clear that the sample does not represent the 
database as a whole. This is because the sample has been selected from cases where education 
rates are available. The countries in which education rate has been measured tend to be more 
                                                     
18 The sample consists of the following countries (all from 1970 until 2010 except where 
explicitly stated otherwise): Argentina, Armenia (from 1995), Australia, Austria, Bahrain (from 
1975), Bangladesh (from 1975), Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros (from 1975), Costa Rica, Croatia 
(from 1995), Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic (from 1995), Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea (from 1995), Estonia (from 1995), Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, 
Germany (from 1990), Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan (from 1995),  Kenya, Kyrgyzstan (from 1995), Latvia (from 1995), 
Lithuania (from 1995), Macedonia (from 1995), Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique (from 1975), Namibia (from 1990), The Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia (from 1995), Saudi Arabia (from 1990), Singapore, Slovenia (from 
1995), South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan (from 1995), 
Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Turkmenistan (from 1995), United Kingdom, United States of America, 
Uruguay, Uzbekistan (from 1995), Vietnam (from 1980), Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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developed than the rest of the database, which is reflected in the sample having a higher mean 
Polity IV score, GDP per capita and median age, and a lower percentage of young adults. 
Year Variable Mean from sample Mean from database 
1970 Polity IV Score -0.65 -1.85 
GDP per capita 6,686 5,150 
Influence of higher educated young adults 1.14 1.11 
Percentage of young adults 40.27 41.89 
Median age 22.60 20.86 
1975 Polity IV Score -1.15 -2.52 
GDP per capita 7,593 5,804 
Influence of higher educated young adults 1.43 1.41 
Percentage of young adults 41.51 43.18 
Median age 22.58 20.83 
1980 Polity IV Score -0.49 -2.07 
GDP per capita 8,571 6,409 
Influence of higher educated young adults 1.65 1.64 
Percentage of young adults 41.97 43.85 
Median age 23.12 21.18 
1985 Polity IV Score 0.40 -1.56 
GDP per capita 8,843 6,614 
Influence of higher educated young adults 1.82 1.81 
Percentage of young adults 41.47 43.43 
Median age 23.92 21.80 
1990 Polity IV Score 2.66 0.29 
GDP per capita 10,032 8,267 
Influence of higher educated young adults 2.00 2.00 
Percentage of young adults 40.72 42.68 
Median age 24.80 22.50 
1995 Polity IV Score 4.20 2.18 
GDP per capita 10,013 84,80 
Influence of higher educated young adults 2.26 2.25 
Percentage of young adults 38.43 40.81 
Median age 26.40 24.23 
2000 Polity IV Score 4.75 2.87 
GDP per capita 11,476 9,691 
Influence of higher educated young adults 2.97 2.96 
Percentage of young adults 37.40 40.13 
Median age 28.77 25.29 
2005 Polity IV Score 5.06 3.42 
GDP per capita 12,909 10,928 
Influence of higher educated young adults 3.18 3.16 
Percentage of young adults 36.50 39.49 
Median age 28.77 26.39 
2010 Polity IV Score 5.08 3.78 
GDP per capita 13,930 12,192 
Influence of higher educated young adults 3.42 3.40 
Percentage of young adults 35.36 38.37 
Median age 29.94 27.65 
Figure 6: Mean statistics of the research sample and database by year 
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Methodology 
 The goal of this statistical analysis is to measure up the strength of the variable 
“influence of higher educated young adults” in predicting the Polity IV score when compared to 
the other demographic variables proposed by Dyson (median age) and Cincotta and Doces 
(percentage of young adults). Since all variables involved are ordinal scale variables, linear 
regression tests (with the Polity IV score as the dependent variable) will be carried out in which 
the predictive strength of each variable will be compared by their respective standardized 
coefficients (Beta), as well as their statistical significance.  Also, the overall predictive strength of 
the model will be measured by the coefficient of determination (adjusted R2). This linear 
regression test needs to be done twice to measure up the influence of higher educated young 
adults against the median age and the percentage of young adults separately. This is because 
these two variables are basically two different variables that serve to measure the same trend 
(the demographic transition). If both of these variables would be included in the same linear 
regression test, it would produce misleading results. 
Also, the author’s claim that the role of youth has changed over time needs to be tested. 
That is why the sample is split by year and then linear regressions tests are carried out only by 
using cases that belong in the same year. Again, this needs to be carried out twice: once to 
compare the predictive strength of influence of higher educated young adults with that of 
median age, and once to compare its predictive strength with the percentage of young adults. 
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Chapter 3: The findings and their 
meaning 
 In the previous chapter, explanations were made on how the statistical research is 
prepared. In this chapter, we proceed to presenting the findings that this research has yielded, 
as well as how to interpret them. 
Linear regressions irrespective of time 
 Figure 7 (see below) demonstrates the results of two linear regressions in which Polity IV 
is the dependent variable. Model 1 compares the predictive strength of the influence of higher 
educated young adults with median age and GDP per capita. In model 2, median age is replaced 
by the percentage of young adults and the same linear regression test is done. 
  
Model  Beta Statistical 
significance 
Adjusted 
R2 
1 (Constant) (n/a) 0.000 0.378 
GDP per capita 0.103 0.033 
Influence of higher educated young adults 0.198 0.000 
Median age 0.423 0.000 
2 (Constant) (n/a) 0.000 0.359 
GDP per capita 0.158 0.001 
Influence of higher educated young adults 0.219 0.000 
Percentage of young adults -0.348 0.000 
Figure 7: Two linear regressions (dependent variable is Polity IV score) 
 
In both models, the influence of higher educated young adults appears to be the second 
strongest predictive variable of the Polity IV Score, behind median age and percentage of young 
adults respectively. Also, interestingly, GDP per capita turns out to be the weakest variable in 
both models. Although in both models 1 all variables are capable of predicting Polity IV with 
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statistical significance, interestingly GDP per capita has the least significance in this respect 
(0.033 and 0.001).  
Linear regressions by year  
When carrying out separate linear regressions by year for model 1, we get the results as 
presented in figure 8 (see below).  
 
 Figure 8: Linear regression (dependent variable is Polity IV score) by year for model 1, 
1970-2010 
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 When carrying out separate linear regressions by year, all three independent variables 
still manage to have statistically significant predicting value, as indicated by the multiple 
markers depicted in the graph (each marker indicates a Beta value with a statistical significance 
smaller than 0.10). However, what is most striking in this graph is how stable the beta values of 
the percentage of higher educated young adults are over time when compared to the beta 
values of the other two independent variables. For the percentage of higher educated young 
adults, the beta values only fluctuate by less than 0.2, whereas the beta values of the other two 
independent variables vary considerably more and even go from positive to negative. Also, the 
percentage of higher educated young adults is the only independent variable with p-values that 
are constantly below 0.5, meaning that, for some years, the other two independent variables 
actually are more likely to be misleading rather than of any predicting value for some years.  
Year Adjusted R2 
1970 0.521 
1975 0.487 
1980 0.450 
1985 0.457 
1990 0.484 
1995 0.270 
2000 0.269 
2005 0.222 
2010 0.199 
Figure 9: Coefficients of determination for linear regressions by year (independent 
variable is Polity IV score) for model 1, 1970-2010 
 
 Figure 9 (see above) illustrates how the overall predictive value of linear regressions in 
model decreases over time. Interestingly, the beta values of the percentage of higher educated 
young adults are statistically most significant when the R2 scores are also highest, whereas 
median age produces higher beta values at times when the adjusted R2 scores are lower. 
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Figure 10: Linear regression (dependent variable is Polity IV score) by year for model 2, 1970-
2010  
 
Figure 10 produces similar results as in figure 819, but the percentage of higher educated 
young adults perform slightly better this time. The fluctuations in the beta values are even 
                                                     
19 Indirectly confirming how similar the variables of median age and the percentage of young 
adults really are. 
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smaller than in figure 8 and the p-values are still constantly below 0.5, where the other two 
variables fluctuate more heavily and incidentally have p-values above 0.5. Also, interestingly, 
the beta values of GDP per capita do not reach as far below zero as in figure 8, which further 
undermines its reliability. 
Year Adjusted R2 
1970 .529 
1975 .484 
1980 .450 
1985 .453 
1990 .475 
1995 .253 
2000 .286 
2005 .241 
2010 .228 
Figure 11: Coefficients of determination for linear regressions by year (independent 
variable is Polity IV score) for model 2, 1970-2010 
 As expected, figure 11 shows similar numbers as figure 9. Again, the years in which 
percentage of adults aged 15-29 receives beta values that are statistically significant are also the 
ones with the lowest R2 values.  
Curiously, the adjusted R2 scores for model 2 are higher than those for model 1, whereas 
model 1 receives a higher R2 in the overall regression in figure 7.  
Conclusion and discussion 
 After rigorous statistical testing, it remains inconclusive which of the variables has won 
the contest of being the best predictor of the Polity IV score. On the one hand, the variables 
proposed by Dyson (median age) and Cincotta and Doces (percentage of young adults) score 
some strong results, particularly when in the post-cold War era. But on the other hand, the new 
variable “influence of higher educated young adults” knows how to defend itself. As 
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demonstrated by the very stable beta values in figures 8 and 10, it has proven itself to be a 
trustworthy predictor of the Polity IV score, no matter which year you ask it to do its job. 
What is more, there are still reasons to doubt the strength of Dyson and Cincotta and 
Doces’ variables, even after quantitative analysis. Their variables score the strongest when the 
overall predictive strength of the linear regression is weakest. What is worse, their variables 
show a large amount of fluctuation over time as to which direction it is supposed to predict the 
Polity IV score is going. This would mean that young adults would pose a threat to 
democratization, whereas their role would be benign in this regard a few decades later. Not 
only does this observation make any logical sense, it has not been suggested at all by Dyson and 
Cincotta and Doces themselves.  
This stalemate illustrates how much political demography still needs further research 
before it is capable of making any assertions regarding the role of young adults with 
persuasiveness. After all, what kind of youth are we talking about? The data and arguments 
presented in this paper already suggest that education stimulates pro-democracy sentiments 
among the youth, but how exactly the force of education interacts with autocratic political 
regimes is open to debate.  If more research into this topic is to be done in the future, 
particularly more data regarding education is required. Data regarding the education rates of 
the poorest, most underdeveloped countries is scarce, and these are particularly the countries 
that are relatively often not democratic. Also, more recent data can help give a clearer picture 
of what the role of youth and education is in the twentieth century. 
An interesting by-product of this research is the discovery that the predicting value of 
economic development is relatively poor when related to the other independent variables. This 
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goes against expectations and established consensus within the modernization theory 
community. The question of why the GDP per capita scores so poorly after the end of the Cold is 
worthy of a separate study. 
Finally, the academic community is in need of a comprehensive database that details 
how democratization occurs. A reliable source that gives quantitative insights into this would 
have been extremely valuable in assessing the role of youth. For instance, are the most violent 
overthrows of autocratic regimes also occurring in countries that have the biggest proportion of 
young adults in their populations? Without quantitative sources, we can only speculate. 
Until that time, the Arab rebels will have to wait until they get their definite answer on 
whether their efforts truly contribute to the democratization of their countries. Meanwhile, all 
they can do is get back to their studies and hope for the best. 
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The dataset used for this paper can be accessed at the following website: 
http://tinyurl.com/thesisdata 
The above webpage also includes all source files from which the dataset was created, as 
well as files containing calculations with which new variables were created from the source 
variables. 
